Which case held that deadly force may be used to prevent escape only if the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury?

Which case held that deadly force may be used to prevent escape only if the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury?

• A. Coolidge v. New Hampshire
• B. Tennessee v. Garner
• C. Katz v. US
• D. US v. Leon

Answer: (B)

The key idea is that using deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect is only allowed when there is a real, imminent threat to life or serious bodily harm. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court struck down the old rule that police could shoot a fleeing felon to prevent escape regardless of threat. The Court held that deadly force may be used to prevent escape only if the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or to others. This establishes a constitutional limit that protects individuals from unnecessary, deadly force while preserving public safety when there is an actual danger. The other cases involve different Fourth Amendment issues—warrant requirements, privacy expectations, and the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception—so they don’t address the specific standard Tennessee v. Garner sets for deadly force.

The key idea is that using deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect is only allowed when there is a real, imminent threat to life or serious bodily harm. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court struck down the old rule that police could shoot a fleeing felon to prevent escape regardless of threat. The Court held that deadly force may be used to prevent escape only if the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or to others. This establishes a constitutional limit that protects individuals from unnecessary, deadly force while preserving public safety when there is an actual danger. The other cases involve different Fourth Amendment issues—warrant requirements, privacy expectations, and the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception—so they don’t address the specific standard Tennessee v. Garner sets for deadly force.